

DRAFT: FRZ  
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PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD

PANEL "B"

GROUP I - INVENTORY OF COLD WAR MEANS

1. The problem is twofold: (1) How best to direct and coordinate the total psychological effort of the United States; and (2) How best to influence the effort of other nations.

2. For the purposes of consideration at the PSB level where the primary function is one of coordination in order to provide an integrated and effective national effort, the greatest emphasis should be placed on the consideration and selection of fields on which the cold war is to be conducted. After all fields of endeavor have been examined a suggested selection of weapons will be indicated. Their choice, as well as the technique of their usage, can be decided by the implementing agencies that wage the cold war.

3. The following are the general fields in which psychological warfare is waged:

a. Government

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b. Economic systems

25X1X8

c. Labor

d. Agriculture

e. Professions

25X1X8

f. Press and radio

25X1X8

g. Culture

h. Politics

i. Religion

j. Education

25X1X8

k. Science

l. Military

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4. (Format for each "field")
  - a. Statement of its significance
    - (1) Nationally
    - (2) Internationally
  - b. Statement of its elements
  - c. Statement regarding coordination
  - d. Statement regarding adequacy
  - e. Statement of reasons for inadequacy
  - f. Statement of suggested means for action
  - g. Recommendations

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**SECRET****MILITARY****A. Significance**

Military potential and capacity is the physical element of power in a development of a position of strength; the buttress of foreign policy. The immediate object of foreign policy is national security; the long-range object is world peace.

Rearmament, and advancement to a sound military posture and economic stability and progress, are primordial guarantees to peace. The United States and its allies accept this fundamental postulate. The challenge by the Soviet Regime to a power position of dominance mandates the immediate counter response by the free world. The preeminence of military strength must, therefore, be reflected within all other fields of endeavor. Western world rearmament is to avert war, not precipitate it, and, secondarily, to wage war successfully if the primary objective is not achieved.

**B. Elements**

1. Regional collective security arrangements (Brussels Treaty)
2. Military Alliances and Pacts (North Atlantic Treaty; Pacific Pacts)
3. National security aid programs (MDAP)
4. Balanced national military forces.
5. Balanced international military forces (NATO).
6. Integrated international forces (European Army).
7. International conscripts (Legion forces).
8. Truman doctrine (Greece).
9. Occupation forces (Germany-Austria).
10. Military advisory missions (Turkey, Philippines, Iran).
11. Paramilitary forces.

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12. Base rights

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12. Base rights (Spain, North Africa).
13. Ex-enemy rearmament (Germany, Japan, Italy).
14. Strategic materials stockpiling.
15. Foreign military training programs (U.S. military schools).
16. Selective Service Law
17. Lodge Bill
18. Universal military training
19. Mass destruction weapons (ABC)
20. Guided missiles

C. Coordination

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C. Coordination

1. National Level:

Inter-Service -- Joint Chiefs of Staff

Inter-Departmental - Inter-Departmental Advisory Committee

Deputies Meetings - Consultants Meetings; working staff liaison.

Policy Level - National Security Council

Organization and Programs - Congressional Committees

Science (Research and Development) - Atomic Energy Commission

Industrial Mobilization - ODM; Munitions Board

2. International Level:

Council of Defense Ministers - NATO

SHAPE - Regional planning groups of NATO

United Nations Military Staff Committee

United Nations Military Observer Teams (Palestine, Kashmir)

Military Aid Advisory Groups (MAAG)

Bilateral Pacts (Australia, New Zealand, Philippines)

Armed Standardization Boards

Foreign Military Training Exchange Program

D. Adequacy

Western Europe and UN forces in Korea at present rely on the United States for military strength. On September 9, 1950, the President agreed to "substantial increases" in the strength of the United States forces in Europe. "A basic element in the implementation of this decision is the degree to which our friends match our actions in this regard."

Britain and France

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Britain and France, senior partners with NATO, are committed to three-year programs of rearmament and expansion. It appears that the current military force and budget commitments of these nations are near the elastic limit with respect to the domestic, political, and economic situation. However, <sup>the intention!</sup> Congress in the fulfillment of the annual increments and levies appears to be behind schedule.

The current ratio of military strength in Europe between the East and the West is on the order of 80 to 12.

Inasmuch as the concept of "collective balance of forces" is moving too slowly, a more dynamic approach, a more reliable goal, such as an integration of forces, would be an incentive and an inducement more profitably <sup>perceived.</sup> ensued. For the defense of Europe to be adequate, German participation in an early phase in the planning and development appears to be a <sup>aprio</sup> systematic prerequisite. The unitary and integrated approach should be more palatable to both the French and Germans. A crying need is to reduce the East-West differential as quickly and as effectively as possible.

More nations, particularly from the Latin American Bloc, are needed in the Korean effort.

The United States defense mobilization effort with respect to forces will soon reach its plan <sup>and</sup> limits—21 divisions, 18 combat groups, 1100 ships in commission. Public Law 655 of the 81st Congress suspended all laws restricting the numbers in uniform. An authority is, therefore, adequate to meet contingency expansion. Lacking, however, is the trained reserve base which a program of universal military training or service could provide. Objections to a legislative action of this type should have lost force with our legislators since the outbreak of the Korean War.

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The guided missile development program must proceed from the laboratory and testing phase to the product<sup>or</sup> and procurement phase if its possible utilization in the period of crisis is to be adequate.

The United States atomic stockpile for strategic application has reached a state of safe proportions. The concentration of effort to development adequacy in the field of tactical application, which may, after all, have greater utility in this era of limited warfare, should receive the highest priority attention.

### E. Inadequacy

The French period of military service, which is limited to one year, is inadequate and should approximate the two-year period of her principal allies-- Britain and the United States. This condition accounts in part for her inability to meet force commitments on schedule.

The French attitude and the German position of the question of German rearmament could be reconciled through the permissibility of integration of forces into a European Army instead of national contribution to the NATO defense structure per se.

Limited Latin American participation in the Korean War may be attributable possibly to United States reticence in not pursuing the objective more aggressively and directly. It would appear that our own military people are as much at fault in this regard as any.

The American body politic is ready and willing to accept universal military service. The Congress has misread and misconstrued the opinions, attitude, and expression of the people. The present draft and National Guard System are uncertain foundations for a policy of military strength. They are inadequate to the long-term requirements.

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The technological

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The technological dogma of the scientist for perfection may be a contributing factor to the slow translation from development to product in the guided missile field. It would be presumptive to state categorically that this is the case, but the inadequacy and seemingly slow progress in this field may be deliberate and intentional until an higher order of means is achieved by some of our slower moving allies.

The previous allocation of the critical mass in the atomic energy program to a rigid criteria requirement has permitted concentration solely on the strategic mission product. <sup>Broader</sup> ~~Handicapped~~ reactors, and improved techniques, as well as the adequacy of present reserves, should permit concentration of effort on tactical mission requirements heretofore inadequately rated in the priority scale.

#### F. Suggested Means for Action

United States diplomatic and military representatives to counsel concertedly the French Government on the matter of annual commitments of force buildup <sup>which</sup> can be best achieved by increasing the period of military service to two years.

The President, key senators, Secretary of Defense, Secretary of State, and General Eisenhower to support publicly the concept of the European Army with West German participation, the <sup>Board</sup> ~~held~~ Republican inducement to be attained through some measures of political and economic equality within the North Atlantic community.

Latin American support in the form of forces to the Korean struggle should be approached more directly and forcefully and welcomed as continuing evidence of Western Hemisphere solidarity.

Every publicity

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Every publicity stratagem should be used to create discussion and institutional support for proceeding to the enactment of Universal Military Training as a first order of business at the next Congressional session.

G. Recommendations

The full force of direct and indirect measures should be applied to achieve the following:

1. U.S. and allied support for expediting General Eisenhower's mission to form an integrated European Army with German participation.

2. Public, institutional, and official support for UMT enactment at the next Congressional session.

3. World thinking, attitude, and psychology be steered from the *STRATEGIC* atomic concept to the limited tactical application concept to pave the way for its probable use in this manner as a deterrent to Soviet adoption of limited war strategy in other parts of the world.

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## The Field of Politics

### a. Significance of the field

The field of politics is perhaps the most significant field of endeavor of those usable in the cold war with respect to nations outside the Iron Curtain. If you subscribe to the theory that all psychological activity is undertaken not just to create a desirable frame of mind among the recipients, for camaraderie is itself a merely enjoyable by-product, but to influence the recipients into undertaking a course of action which will be beneficial to the initiator of the psychological activity, then the significance of the field of politics is readily seen. For it is in the field of politics, in taking political action in those countries where freedom of political action is still accorded the populace that the bulk of the psychological effort is translated into beneficial action that such is not true on the other side of the Iron Curtain is self-evident. In the light of this one may conclude that psychological effort directed to the Soviet bloc can be effective only in one of two ways, either to be sufficiently inflammatory to obtain short term and extremely agitational reaction such as is manifested in resistance groups of to build a sympathetic potential of value at some future date when either freedom of political action returns to the people or our invading armies need the support of the peoples. Howsoever, it can be seen from above that political warfare cannot be significantly conducted at this time against the other side of the Iron Curtain since there is no freedom of political action, while this statement is not entirely applicable to the certain activities sometimes surreptitiously undertaken in covert political warfare, it nevertheless follows that even such activities can at best hope for only confusion

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and resulting inefficiency in the ranks of our advisory. In the United States, the political posture of our nation is one which creates tremendous psychological impact throughout the world. It is here that this nation must demonstrate in the field of politics a unity of purpose (e.g. bipartisan foreign policy) consistency rather than vacillation and earnest endeavor towards establishment of the four freedoms throughout the rest of the world.

b. Important elements within the field of politics

The important reaction to be obtained in the field of politics therefore is the translation on political action within the United States into effective psychological force which in turn is translated into political action in countries outside the Soviet bloc beneficial to this nation, and the relatively minor role of confusing political action within the Soviet Bloc by covert measures to gain the advantages of resulting inefficiencies. It follows then that the important elements in the field of politics are both the political parties within a country and the political action groups within the country which support and motivate them. Among these latter may be listed the youth movements, women's groups, religious groups and labor organizations insofar as they result in organized political action and of these the last is probably most deserving of careful treatment for while youth represents a potential and future battlefield, and while all these groups have great influence one on the other, it is at the labor level that the challenge of communism must be met today. The reference here is not to labor as a potential fomenter of strikes or retarder of industry but as a political action group which is everywhere assuming more and

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more importance at the poles.

c. Necessary Coordination

The requirement is for coordination within the United State to provide a singleness to our political posture. Hence any efforts towards a bipartisan appearance to our foreign policy appears desirable. The coordination however must go beyond the political parties themselves and seek reflection in the political action groups within the United States, in order that these may influence similar groups in foreign countries. Hence American youth groups, labor groups and the like should seek to capture the status of world leadership in their fields and once captured they should apply this leadership along lines beneficial to the U.S. Furthermore, there is a prime requirement to coordinate our actions internationally so that they will have the flavor of stemming from the grass-root desires of the free world. For any such effort to be coordinated, it is first demanded that our policy decisions present us with a firm and projected program of action. Without this any coordinating will be but a backing and filling process mainly defensive in nature and with little other real purpose.

d. Adequacy of the Effort

That the present effort is grossly inadequate in the field of politics is particularly evidenced by the large Communist membership still present in France and Italy. In spite of large U.S.

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economic contributions to these countries, and the close alignment of the governments which has resulted, the influence of the voter who is not in direct contact with these activities has been slight. While the trend has not been unfavorable, serious inroads in the ranks of the Communist parties of these countries commensurate with the U.S. effort undertaken in them has not been made. This condition signals serious shortcomings in our psychological effort. Probably the greatest of these is our expenditure of this effort in a defensive and purposeless manner. In short, we wage psychological warfare without calculated campaigning in the allied field of political warfare whereas the USSR points the great bulk of its psychological effort to very definite and aggressive political objectives.

e. Recommendations

We must at once seek to accomplish the following revision of our psychological effort.

- (1) Coordinate the various efforts of U.S. governmental agencies and political action groups within the U.S. to provide a desirable and united political posture which in turn can directly influence foreign politics through the media of political warfare rather than continue with loose and uncorrelated defensive action in the propaganda field.
- (2) Elevate the psychological planners and warriors to positions which permit them a more determining role in the formulation of foreign policy.

(3) Correlate

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- (3) Correlate our effort in this field with those of our allies to provide an integrated front against the integrated front now present within the Soviet Bloc.
- (4) Exercise world leadership through all American groups having international significance.
- (5) Concentrate political warfare on peoples capable of free political action in order that they may benefit the U.S. by their actions.
- (6) Obtain the psychological initiative from these activities and base its pursuance on a sound course of action towards America's objectives.
- (7) Permit the psychological and political warriors a greater role in national planning so that the courses of action taken by this government become more psychologically realistic and capable of attainment.

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